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Abstract
This paper addresses the issue of price signaling in a model of vertical relationship
between a manufacturer and a retailer who share the same information about quality,
unlike consumers who do not observe it a priori. We show that delegating the price setting
task to a retailer and controlling it through a vertical contract (two-part tari¤) helps
drastically reduce the number of price signaling equilibria available to the retailer. The
outcome of a unique price charged to consumers obtains without invoking the consumer
sophistication usually required by selection criterions. The vertical contract turns to be
the most e¢ cient way for the vertical chain to tie its hands on a unique nal price. This
price may disclose or not information to consumers depending on their initial optimism
about quality. We prove that there also exists circumstances where consumers prefer ex
ante not to learn the true quality through price.
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1 Introduction
After Spence (1973) stated that rms could signal product quality by taking some costly
actions, a number of theoretical papers have explored the idea that prices have a specic role
to play in signaling quality. Following Bagwell and Riordan (1991), one important feature
of the market for experience goods is that rms set prices above the full information level
to signal high-quality new products. Indeed, like most signaling behaviors, price signaling
may entail some ine¢ ciencies. To credibly inform consumers that quality is high, the rm
often needs to distort its price, either upward or downward, compared to what would prevail
under full information.1 More precisely, when a monopolist uses price as a signal of quality,
Bagwell and Riordan (1991) prove the need and existence of an upward distortion in price to
fully reveal that quality is high at the Riley separating equilibrium outcome.2
Building on this model, we open the black box of the monopoly to allow for a vertical
contract in the form of a two-part tari¤ between a manufacturer and a retailer. Both of them
know product quality better than consumers do, hence the vertical contract species a con-
sumer price which serves the same task of signaling quality as that investigated by Bagwell
and Riordan (1991). Our predictions somewhat complement their ndings but also di¤er in
several respects. We still nd that an upward-distorted price may fully reveal that quality is
high. Nevertheless, we show that such an information disclosure occurs provided that con-
sumer prior information does not involve too much optimism about quality. Moreover, in this
separating equilibrium outcome, the vertical contract does implement a unique price signal-
ing quality without the standard use of equilibrium renement  specically, the additional
restrictions imposed by Bagwell and Riordan (1991) on out-of-equilibrium beliefs in the spirit
1Besides Bagwell and Riordan (1998), Daughety and Reinganum (2008) also show that rms need to distort
prices upward to signal high quality in a continuum-type model where price is the only means of signaling
quality. When quality is environmental, Mahenc (2008) states that the price distortion due to signaling goes
upward provided that marginal costs increase with environmental quality. Nevertheless, prices may be driven
below the full-information levels when the rm uses an additional signaling instrument such as advertising
expenditures (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1986, Linnemer, 1998, Hertzendorf and Overgaard, 2001, and Fluet
and Garella, 2002).
2After Riley (1979), the so called Riley equilibrium is the only separating equilibrium outcome that is
Pareto undominated from the informed agents standpoint.
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of the intuitive criterion(see Cho and Kreps, 1987) It turns out that the vertical contract
makes it possible to ignore consumer out-of-equilibrium beliefs, and the manufacturer uses
the franchise to commit the retailer on the (most protable) Riley outcome.
However, the Riley outcome is Pareto dominated by pooling equilibrium outcomes when
consumers, before purchase, rather believe quality to be high. We show that, in this way,
the vertical contract implements the most protable pooling price, thereby concealing in-
formation about quality. Although this result departs from the traditional concentration
on the Riley separating equilibrium outcome, it is economically appealing in the following
sense. If the vertical contract allows for a commitment on a particular signaling behavior, it
seems reasonable that the manufacturer ties the retailers hands on the signaling equilibrium
that Pareto dominates the other equilibria, even though it is pooling. The cost of disclosing
information through separating equilibrium prices may be a burden to the manufacturer,
especially when consumers are highly optimistic about the product quality. In that event,
the manufacturer is better o¤ concealing information, contrary to standard predictions based
on the renement of signaling equilibria.
Moreover, the vertical contract restores the continuity in pricing behaviors between games
of incomplete and complete information. If there is a very slight chance that quality is low,
the pooling price implemented through the vertical contract does not di¤er signicantly from
that in a situation with no chance at all of low quality. Mailath et alii (1993) raise the
same continuity argument to motivate the selection of undefeated equilibria in signaling
games. Thanks to the vertical contract, we predict signaling behaviors similar to those
selected by their renement, but once again, these predictions do not require restrictions on
out-of-equilibrium beliefs. In other terms, we do not need the assumption that uninformed
consumers are highly sophisticated in the way they build and update their beliefs in order
to get economically intuitive signaling behaviors. The only assumption made on consumer
inference here is that they revise their beliefs according to Bayes rule when observing a
price. Delegating the price setting task to the retailer and controlling it through the vertical
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contract drastically reduces the number of price signaling equilibria available to the retailer.
Finally, the analysis provides insight on the circumstances under which consumers prefer ex
ante to learn or not the true quality through price.
The paper is organized as follows. In the section 2, we lay down the model and the
assumptions. Then in section 3, we characterize the equilibria under full information and
asymmetric information in the case of no delegation. In section 4, we then examine the case
of delegation. Section 5 concludes. An appendix contains most of proofs.
2 Assumptions and notations
Consider a good produced by a manufacturer and sold by a retailer, both rms acting as a mo-
nopolist. In the following, we will consider two situations in turn: in the rst one, both rms
form a vertically integrated structure and in the second one, both rms act independently.
The former case can be interpreted as a situation where the manufacturer totally controls the
distribution level while the latter one represents a situation where the manufacturer chooses
to delegate distribution to an independent seller.
Using the terminology of Nelson (1970), the product is assumed to be an experience
good in the sense that consumers cannot observe its actual quality before purchase. We
denote q the quality characteristic of the product and we further assume, for simplicity, that
q may be either high (q = H) or low (q = L) with H > L  0. Higher quality is more costly
to produce so that the manufacturer incurs constant marginal costs of production denoted
cq for q = H;L, with cH = c > 0 and cL = 0. In addition, the retailing activity does not
generate any specic cost related to the quality so that we normalize the cost of retailing to
zero:
A priori, consumers perceive the quality to be high with probability 0  prob(q = H),
and low with probability 1   0  prob(q = L), 0 2 (0; 1). When deciding to purchase the
good, consumers observe the price p, they try to infer some information about quality and
thereby they update their beliefs. Let  (p) : R+ ! [0; 1] denote the consumersposterior
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belief that quality of product 0 is H upon seeing p. For any belief , we denote ~q(p) =
(p) +L 2 [L;H] the expectation of quality formed by consumers, where  = H  L is the
quality gap between a high and low-quality product. As there is a one to one relationship
between expectation ~q and belief , we will use only ~q in the following, to save on notations.
In particular, we denote q0  0 + L 2 [L;H] the prior quality expectation.
We assume further that aggregate demand is a smooth and strictly decreasing function
of price when positive, cutting both axes, and is an increasing function of perceived quality,
that we denote D(p; ~q).3 Note that our assumption of a common prior and posterior beliefs
on quality does not impede heterogeneity in consumerspreferences.
For the rest of this section, we do as if the perceived quality ~q were constant and thus
independent of the price p. This is done in order to dene some functions of interest for the
analysis. First, denote by pmax~q the reservation price for the perceived quality ~q, such that
D(p; ~q) = 0 for any p  pmax~q . Assume that pmaxH > c and pmaxL > 0, and it follows that:
D(c;H) > 0 and D(0; L) > 0 (1)
which ensures that both qualities priced at marginal cost can get a positive demand under
complete information about their characteristic, making their presence on the market socially
e¢ cient.4
We denote:
(p;x; ~q) = (p  x)D(p; ~q) (2)





the marginal cost x  pmax~q and the quality ~q 2 [L;H] expected by consumers. The marginal
3Note that our general specication of demand encompasses several possibilities for how quality expectation
may a¤ect the slope of demand with respect to price. Indeed, consider the popular Mussa Rosen preferences
specication: assume a continuum, with unitary mass, of heteregenous consumers indexed by y 2 [0; 1]
following the uniform distribution, each one buying at most one unit. Then the individual utility is u = y~q p
and the aggregate demand is D(p; ~q) = 1   p
~q
. In that case, increasing quality makes the demand less price
elastic. Consider now a linear city where the product is located in 0 and consumers are indexed by their
location y in [ a; a], still following the uniform distribution and where a > 0 is large. Here the utility can be
specied as u = ~q   ty   p where t is the transportation cost parameter. And the aggregate demand writes
D(p; ~q) = 2
t
(~q   p). where quality a¤ects only the reservation price.
4As we will show in the next section, the condition D(0; L) > 0 is actually necessary for separation in the
signaling game with the vertically integrated rm.
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cost x will correspond to the marginal cost of production in a vertically integrated rm and
to the wholesale price when the manufacturer and the retailer are independent. As long as
demand D (p; ~q) is positive, we assume strict concavity of (p;x; ~q) with respect to price.5
We also dene the (unique) optimal price p^(x; ~q) as:
p^(x; ~q)  arg max
px
(p;x; ~q) (3)
that is increasing in x and ~q, and we denote:
^(x; ~q)  (p^(x; ~q);x; ~q) (4)
the corresponding maximized prot level.
In the analysis, we will often meet the following function:
f(p;x; ~q)  (p;x; ~q)  ^(x; L) (5)




, for any x  pmax~q and for any ~q 2 [L;H] : The function f(p;x; ~q)
represents the di¤erence between the (variable) prot a seller, perceived as a ~q quality seller,
can make by facing the cost x and when charging p, and the maximum prot ^(x; L) it can
earn in the worst situation, that is, when consumers perceived it as a low-quality seller. A
number of interesting properties of f recorded in the following lemma will be useful for the
analysis.





, that we denote p(x; ~q) and p(x; ~q) with p(x; ~q) < p(x; ~q). The function
f(:;x; ~q) is also positive between the roots and negative either. Moreover, both roots are strictly
interior when ^(x; L) > 0 and they are increasing in x. When ^(x; L) = 0 then p(x; ~q) = x
and p(x; ~q) = pmax~q :
Proof: See Appendix A.




to be decreasing or not too increasing in price, that is m0(p)  1.
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As will be clear below, the threshold prices identied in Lemma 1 help characterize the
set of separating and pooling price equilibria in the signaling game. Specically, this will
enable us to clearly dene the Riley separating equilibrium price and determine whether it
is Pareto dominated or not by pooling equilibrium prices.
3 Signaling quality in the vertically integrated structure: the
case of no delegation
We consider in this section the situation where the manufacturer and the retailer form an
integrated vertical structure, that acts as a monopolist on the nal market. Under complete
information, consumers are able to distinguish perfectly between both qualities and the price
p^(c;H) (respectively p^(0; L)) denotes the optimal price for a high-quality (resp. for a low-
quality) product. The monopolist is making ^(c;H) if of high quality and ^(0; L) otherwise.
Under asymmetric information, the integrated rm may choose either to disclose his
private information on quality through separating prices, or to conceal this information by
setting pooling prices. The monopolist maximizes prot with respect to price, given the beliefs
held by consumers after observing this price. This objective denes a signaling game similar
to that investigated by Bagwell and Riordan (1991). The monopolists pricing strategies
must be supported as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Many of the proof techniques
used by Bagwell and Riordan (1991) are readily adapted for characterizing the PBE in our
setting. We will consider in turn the issue of separating price equilibria and of pooling price
equilibria.
3.1 The set of separating outcomes






in the integrated structure. As usual,
such an equilibrium must satisfy two kinds of constraints: rst, individual rationality (IR)
constraints and, second, incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. The IR constraints ensure
that the monopolist nds it protable to choose an equilibrium price rather than the opti-
mal price associated with the worst belief that consumers can hold from the monopolists
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standpoint, i. e., ~q = L.








  ^ (0; L) : (IRL)
The IC constraints require that the price set for one quality would not be worth mimicking




  (pIL; c; L) (ICH)
(pIL; 0; L)  (pIH ; 0; H): (ICL)
We simplify the analysis of the set of prices satisfying the above constraints by noting the
following two claims.
Claim 1 The constraint (IRL) is necessarily binding.
Indeed, by denition, the monopolist correctly identied as selling a low-quality product
cannot get more than by charging the price p^(0; L). It follows that, at a separating equilib-
rium, the low-quality price is equal to the low-quality price under complete information:
pIL = p^(0; L):
Claim 2 The constraint (ICH) is satised once (IRH) holds.
Indeed, this is because by denition ^ (c; L)  (pIL; c; L) for all pIL.
Both results imply that the set of high-quality separating prices is described by the re-
maining constraints, (IRH) and (ICL) taken into account that pIL = p^(0; L) and (p
I
L; c; L) =
^ (c; L). It follows that (IRH) and (ICL) can be rewritten respectively as:
f(pIH ; c;H)  0 and f(pIH ; 0; H)  0: (6)
We fully characterize the set of prices pIH that satisfy (6), in the proof of the following
Proposition, that only exhibits the least-cost separating price equilibrium.
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pIL = p^(0; L)
pIH =

p(0; H) whenever c < c
p^(c;H) otherwise.
where c > 0 denotes the (unique) cost value such that p(0; H) = p^(c;H).
Proof: See Appendix B
Proposition 1 characterizes the separating equilibrium outcome that entails the minimum
loss in prot needed to fully reveal that quality is high: this is the so-called Riley separating
equilibrium outcome (after Riley, 1979). As a result, the equilibrium price of a low-quality
good is never distorted compared to the full information situation. By contrast, when c < c,
the separating price for high quality involves an upward distortion compared to the full
information price, that is, pIH = p(0; H) exceeds p^(c;H). This upward distorted price is such
that it makes the low-quality monopolist indi¤erent between mimicking the high-quality
counterpart by charging p(0; H) and being correctly identied by consumers by choosing pIL.
However, whenever c  c, then p^(c;H) belongs to the set of separating prices and hence it
is always possible for the high-quality seller to signal its quality without cost. More precisely,
if pmaxH is su¢ ciently large so that p^(p
max
H ; H) > p(0; H), then there always exists a range of
costs c for which signaling quality entails no distortion.
Throughout the proof of Proposition 1, we show that there exists an innity of separat-
ing equilibrium prices. The presence of multiple equilibria is not surprising in a standard
monotonic signaling game such as the one investigated here. Clearly, this is a weakness in
terms of generating behavioral predictions. The solution proposed by the literature to this
problem is to employ renements which impose additional restrictions on the beliefs held by
consumers out of equilibrium. For instance, a standard exercise here would be either to single
out the Riley outcome with the intuitive criterionproposed by Cho and Kreps (1987), or
to show that the Riley outcome defeats all the other separating equilibrium outcomes in
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the sense of Mailath et alii (1993). We do not need to perform the renement exercise here
for one reason that will clearly appear in the next section: the vertical contract makes it
possible to single out a unique signaling price without invoking the consumer sophistication
in building and updating beliefs usually required by selection criterions.
Note that our assumption that D(0; L) > 0, i.e., consumers value positively the low
quality charged at marginal cost, is necessary for separation. Indeed, otherwise ^ (0; L) = 0
and hence (ICL) cannot hold with a strictly positive price pIH .
3.1.1 The set of pooling outcomes
We now turn to the characterization of pooling equilibria if they exist. Let pI denote a pooling
equilibrium price in the integrated structure. Since the price charged by the monopolist is
the same regardless of quality, consumersposterior beliefs after observing this price are the
same as their prior beliefs. Hence, the integrated rm with quality q earns (pI ; cq; q0) in
equilibrium. To conceal information in equilibrium, any pooling price pI must give no less
prot than what the monopolist could get at best if its product were thought to be of low
quality with certainty, that is:
(pI ; cq; q0)  ^ (cq; L) ; for q = H;L: (7)
The set of prices pI such that (7) holds is the set P (q0) of pooling equilibrium prices.
Proposition 2 Whenever p(c; q0)  p(0; q0), any price pI that belongs to P (q0) =

p(c; q0); p(0; q0)

is a pooling equilibrium price for the integrated rm.
Note that the condition for existence of pooling equilibria can be interpreted as an upper
bound of admissible cost c for high quality because p(c; q0) is increasing in c. Intuitively, if c is
high enough ceteris paribus, then any equilibrium of the signalling game involves separation.
Let us show that there exist circumstances under which a pooling equilibrium Pareto
dominates the Riley separating equilibrium, from the perspective of both types of manufac-
turer. Let us examine when this situation occurs. As (pI ; 0; L)  ^ (0; L) by denition of
10
a pooling equilibrium, the low-quality monopolist that chooses pI will always make at least
the equilibrium prot under separation.
The same is not always true for the high-quality monopolist but happens to be true
when the two following conditions are met. First, it must be that the price charged for
the high-quality product is distorted upward relative to the full information situation, i. e.,
pIH = p(0; H), which arises when p(0; H) > p^(c;H). Otherwise, signalling quality would entail
no cost and the high-quality monopolist would never benet from pooling since ^ (c; q0) <
^ (c;H) as long as q0 < H. The second condition is that the high-quality monopolist is indeed
better o¤ with the uninformative price pI than with the separating price p(0; H):
(pI ; c; q0)  (p(0; H); c;H): (8)
Note that condition (8) holds for su¢ ciently high values of q0. Indeed, because ^ (c; q0) is
strictly increasing in q0, we can dene q^0 as the unique threshold in quality expectation such
that
^ (c; q^0) = (p(0; H); c;H): (9)
The left-hand side of (9) is the maximum prot that the high-quality monopolist can
make by holding back information, when consumers believe the expected quality to be q^0.
The critical value q^0 is the quality level such that the high-quality producer is indi¤erent
between signaling quality with the upward-distorted price p(0; H) and concealing information
about quality in the optimal way. We sum up our discussion of pooling equilibria with the
following result.
Proposition 3 For all q0 higher than q^0, there exists at least one pooling equilibrium (actu-
ally an innity of) that Pareto dominates the least-cost separating equilibrium regardless of
the actual quality.
Figure 1 depicts the pooling and separating equilibria for values of c lower than c, rst





















Figure 1: Pooling (thick curves with arrows) and separating (black points) equilibria for both
low and high quality rms when q0 < q^0 (upper panel) and when q0 > q^0 (lower panel).
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lower panel, in the special case of a linear demand D(p; ~q) = 1   p=~q.6 In both panels
and for both the low and high quality, the thick curves with arrows indicate the range of
pooling prots while the black points indicate the least-cost separating prots at the Riley
equilibrium outcome. The white point indicates the perfect information prot for a high-
quality monopolist.Clearly, no pooling equilibrium allows a high-quality monopolist to earn
more than at the least-cost separating price in the upper panel. On the contrary, there is
clearly a range of pooling equilibria that give more revenue to the high-quality monopolist
than the least cost separating price in the lower panel. Note that in both cases, the low-quality
monopolist is always better o¤ when playing a pooling equilibrium price.
As previously mentioned, the presence of multiple equilibria, whether separating or pool-
ing, raises an issue which various authors address making use of equilibrium renements. If
we were applying here the logic of the criterion proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987) to the
multitude of pooling equilibria depicted in Figure 1, we would eliminate all of them as be-
ing unintuitive. As usual, the Riley equilibrium outcome is the only signaling equilibrium
robust to the intuitive criterion regardless of the prior beliefs held by consumers. However,
there is some question of selecting the Riley equilibrium outcome as the most plausible, espe-
cially when it is Pareto dominated (from the monopolists standpoint) by pooling equilibria
as it happens here when q0 > q^0. Roughly speaking, the idea is that both the high- and the
low-quality types should not be wastefully competitive with themselves. Another concern is
the following. When consumers are almost sure that quality is high, one expects the high-
quality monopolist to choose a price fairly close to the full information price p^(c;H). In such
circumstances however, the intuitive criterion happens to emphasize signaling behaviors that
signicantly di¤er from those prevailing under full information. As stated in Proposition 1,
if there is a very slight chance that quality is low, the Riley equilibrium outcome predicts
that the monopolist will set the upward-distorted price pIH = p(0; H) to signal high quality
6 In both panels, the dashed curves depict the family of prots curves for a low-quality monopolist, (p; 0; ~q)
for ~q 2 fL; q0; Hg. The solid curves depict the family of prot curves for a high-quality monopolist, (p; c; ~q)
for ~q 2 fL; q0; Hg.
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whenever c  c, which exceeds p^(c;H). By contrast, the pooling price p^(c; q0) which Pareto
dominates the two prices involved in the Riley equilibrium outcome, tends to p^(c;H) as q0
comes close to H. The interested reader will nd further grounds for criticism of the intuitive
criterion in Mailath et alii (1993). The alternative renement they propose would discard the
Riley equilibrium outcome when q0 > q^0, because it is defeatedby the Pareto dominating
pooling equilibrium outcomes in this parameter conguration. Further examination of the
vertical contract will show how it greatly simplies the issue of selecting a reasonable price
in equilibrium, with no restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
To conclude the analysis, it is worth noting that consumers also benet ex ante from
pooling equilibria under some circumstances. In such cases, there must be unanimity among
all participants (consumers and rms) not to distort price in order to reveal quality, but rather
to conceal information via a pooling price. For this, consumer surplus before purchase must
be higher at the pooling equilibrium price than at the expected price involved by the Riley
separating equilibrium outcome with costly signaling. We examine this possibility throughout
the following example. Assume again that preferences are of Mussa-Rosen type, i.e., consumer
with taste y has utility u = y~q   p when buying one unit of perceived quality ~q at price p
and 0 either. Assuming that y is distributed uniformly on [0; 1] leads to a linear aggregate
demand D(p; ~q) = 1   p=~q. Consider now the parameter conguration such that, rst, the
separating price intended to signal high quality is the upward-distorted price pIH = p(0; H),
and second, there exists a pooling price at which the monopolist earns more prot than at the
least-costly separating prices. The rst condition requires that c < c, that is, c <
p
H with
Mussa-Rosen preferences. The second condition requires that the pooling equilibrium price
p^(c; q0) provides the high-quality monopolist with prot ^ (c; q0) higher than (p(0; H); c;H),
that is, q0  q^0. Is it possible that, under these conditions, consumers nd it ex ante cheaper
to buy the product at price p^(c; q0), rather than at the Riley separating equilibrium prices?
Facing p^(c; q0), a consumer with taste y has expected utility yq0  p^(c; q0) that depends on
the prior quality expectation q0 = 0H + (1  0)L. By contrast, the expected utility in the
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situation of costly revelation of quality is y(0H + (1  0)L)  0p(0; H)  (1  0)p^(0; L).
Indeed, ex ante, with probability 0, the consumer is charged p(0; H) that correctly reveals
that the product is of high quality and, with probability 1   0, he is charged p^(0; L) that
correctly reveals that the product is of low quality. As expected utility of quality is the same
in both situations, it remains to check whether the expected price under costly revelation can
be higher than p^(c; q0). We nally obtain the following result.
Claim 3 Suppose q0  q^0 and c  c. With Mussa-Rosen preferences, the pooling price
p^(c; q0) is cheaper than the expected price under revelation provided that c < 0
p
H. Hence,
ex ante, for all 0 2 ( cpH ; 1), the pooling equilibrium price p^(c; q0) is preferred by both rms
and consumers to revelation.
Proof: See Appendix C.
4 The vertically decentralized structure: the case of delega-
tion
We now consider a similar set-up but where the manufacturer M delegates the task of dis-
tributing and pricing the product on the market to an independent retailer R. Hence, it
is now the retailer R that signals the product quality by choosing its price. Nevertheless,
the decision of the retailer will be inuenced via the procurement contract signed with the
manufacturer.
We consider in the following that the set of possible contracts is limited to the set of two-
part tari¤s. More precisely, the good is exchanged between M and R at a per-unit price w,
while R is paying a franchise F to M: Furthermore, we make two simplifying assumptions: i)
M has all the bargaining power and hence proposes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (w;F ) to R, ii)
consumers know that the contract set is the set of two-part tari¤s but do not observe the terms
of the contract that remain private information shared by M and R. Hence, consumers only
observe the nal price set up by R. Finally, the rest of the notations and assumptions made
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in the vertically integrated structure case also hold in the vertically decentralized structure.
We investigate a four-period signaling game which proceeds as follows. In period one,
Nature selects quality q from the set fH;Lg according to the commonly known probability
distribution 0. In period two, both M and R learn the actual q and M makes a take-it-or-
leave-it o¤er (wq; Fq) to R which accepts or refuses. In period three, in case of acceptance,
R charges p. In period four, consumers observe p but not wq nor Fq, and update their
prior beliefs 0 and hence their quality expectation q0, thereby making their choice between
products on the basis of this observation. Consumers posterior quality expectation after
observing p will also be denoted by ~q (p) : R+ ! [0; 1].
In the spirit of subgame perfection, equilibrium is characterized by rst looking for the con-
sumer prices in the subgame G(w;F ) that starts in period three, (w;F ) = (wH ; FH ; wL; FL)
being the pair of accepted franchise fees and prices. Lastly, the contract choices are deter-
mined.
The prots of the manufacturer and the retailer can be dened as functions of their price,
given consumersbeliefs and the actual quality. The prots of M and R will be denoted
respectively, for q = H;L:7
M = (wq   cq)D (p; ~q) + Fq
and
R = (p  wq)D (p; ~q)  Fq (10)
= (p;wq; ~q)  Fq
As before, from the viewpoint of both M and R, ~q = L is the least favorable quality
expectation that consumers can form, regardless of the actual quality. Indeed, as the demand
is increasing in expected quality, so are the retailers and manufacturers prots. As long as
demand D (p; ~q) is positive, the optimal price that maximizes R with respect to p and
considering ~q xed is p^(wq; ~q) and the retailers maximized prot is ^(wq; ~q)  Fq.
7To save on notations, we omit to condition the prot functions of rms of type q on the contract (wq; Fq).
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4.1 Full information
We record here the benchmark case of complete information. Not surprisingly, the manufac-
turer is able to extract the full surplus of the vertical structure using marginal cost pricing
and charging a fee equal to the corresponding monopoly prot, which makes the retailer in-
di¤erent between accepting or not the contract. Indeed, it is well known that, in our context,
delegating the pricing task to the retailer entails the emergence of double marginalization
and that two-part tari¤s are su¢ cient to eliminate this vertical externality.
To sum up, for q = H;L, the equilibrium wholesale price is equal to the marginal cost,
i.e., wq = cq, the retailer charges the complete information price p^(cq; q) and gets zero prot
while the manufacturer earns the optimal fee equal to the monopoly prot ^(cq; q).
4.2 Asymmetric information
Under asymmetric information, the quality of the product is supposed known to both the
manufacturer and the retailer, but not to the consumers. We start by dening the equilibrium
concept.
4.2.1 The equilibrium concept
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the whole game is a set of price strategies

(wq ; F q ; pq)q=H;L
	
and quality expectation ~q (p) such that, at any period of the game, strategies must be optimal
given that the following player, if any, responds optimally, and given consumersexpectations.
Formally, the optimal condition for M requires that, for q = H;L,
wq ; F

q 2 arg max
wq ;Fq






s.t. R = (pq ;wq; ~q
  pq)  Fq  0: (FCq)
The feasibility constraint (FCq) means that the retailer of type q should accept the contract.8
8 In equilibrium, we expect the manufacturer of any type to always propose a contract that meets the
feasibility constraints. Suppose on the contrary that in equilibrium the contract o¤ered by one type of M is
not accepted; then, this type of M can always secure a positive prot with an acceptable contract simply by
reducing her franchise without a¤ecting the relationship between R and M of the other type.
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The perfection condition for R is for q = H;L;
pq 2 arg maxp 
R = (p;wq; ~q
 (p))  Fq: (11)
Bayesconsistency of beliefs demands that consumers form posterior expectations about
q from observing prices only by using Bayesrule out of equilibrium. It follows that
if pH 6= pL, then ~q(pH) = H and ~q(pL) = L; (12)





4.2.2 The set of separating outcomes in G(w;F )
In this section, we rst characterize the set of separating equilibria if any, for a given pair
of wholesale prices and franchise fees, assuming that contracts have been accepted by the
corresponding type of retailer. Note that our search for separating equilibria in this subgame
amounts to generalize what has been done in the integrated case, to the procurement cost
conguration (wL; wH), provided that the franchises meet the feasibility constraints. In
particular, this requires to explore separating possibilities when the procurement cost of the
high-quality product is lower than the low-quality one.
Constraints for separating equilibria Consider a potential separating equilibrium (pH ; p

L)
of the subgame G (w;F ). Without loss of generality, let consumersbeliefs be the least fa-
vorable ones out of equilibrium from the retailers point of view, i. e., ~q(p) = L for all
p =2 fpH ; pLg. Such beliefs will generate all of the possible perfect Bayesian equilibrium paths.
Indeed, if the retailer of any type does not have an incentive to charge p when ~q(p) 6= L;
then he will not have an incentive when ~q(p) = L, since his prot is lower.
As for the integrated case, we now introduce the two individual rationality constraints.
A type H retailer who is clearly identied as a high-quality provider by consumers must nd
protable to choose pH instead of any other price that fool consumers, giving at best the
variable prot ^(wH ; L):
(pH ;wH ; H)  FH  ^(wH ; L)  FH : (IRH)
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Similarly, the individual rationality constraint for a type L retailer is:
(pL;wL; L)  FL  ^(wL; L)  FL (IRL)
which means that pL must be an optimal strategy when consumers correctly identify the
product as being a low-quality one.
We now turn to the incentive compatibility constraints. First, the type H retailer must
not nd protable to mimic the equilibrium price chosen by the type L retailer, that is:
(pH ;wH ; H)  FH  (pL;wH ; L)  FH : (ICH)
Second, the type L retailer must not nd protable to behave as if he were the type H
retailer, that is:
(pL;wL; L)  FL  (pH ;wL; H)  FL: (ICL)
Given that the contract has already been accepted, the franchise fees do not impact directly
individual rationality nor incentive compatibility constraints: only the wholesale prices mat-
ter.
Analysis We rst establish similar claims as in the integrated case and for the same reasons.
Indeed, observe that the constraint (IRL) reduces to
(pL;wL; L)  ^(wL; L)
and it is necessarily binding. Hence,
pL = p^(wL; L)
that is the complete information equilibrium price corresponding to a procurement cost wL.
We assume that ^(wL; L) > 0 or equivalently that wL < pmaxL , so that p^(wL; L) is an interior
maximum. As will be clear below, this condition is necessary for (ICL) to hold.9
9Recall that in the integrated case, we have similarly assumed that ^(0; L) > 0.
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Also, as before, the constraint (IRH) for a type H retailer implies constraint (ICH). We
are thus left with, rst, the constraint (IRH):
(pH ;wH ; H)  FH  ^(wH ; L)  FH (IRH)
and second the constraint (ICL):
(pL;wL; L)  FL  (pH ;wL; H)  FL
together with the fact that pL = p^(wL; L). We can rewrite (ICL) as
^(wL; L)  FL  (pH ;wL; H)  FL: (ICL)
Simplifying these constraints, we are thus looking for the set  of price pH such that the
two following constraints hold:
(pH ;wH ; H)  ^(wH ; L) (13)
^(wL; L)  (pH ;wL; H): (14)
Note that the assumption ^(wL; L) > 0 is needed for (14) to hold.
The set of separating price equilibria is characterized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider a given pair of wholesale prices (wH ; wL) such that wL < pmaxL .
Any separating price equilibrium (pH ; p

L) of G(w;F ) is such that:
pL = p^(wL; L)
pH 2 






p(wL; H); p(wH ; H)

; p(wH ; H)

when wH > wL
p(wL; H); p(wL; H)
	
when wH = wL
p(wH ; H);min
 
p(wL; H); p(wH ; H)

when wH < wL
Proof: See Appendix D.
We also obtain straightforwardly the following Corollary.
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Corollary 5 The least cost separating price that signals quality H, whenever it exists, is





p(wL; H); p^(wH ; H)

if wH < wL;
p(wL; H) if wH = wL
max (p(wL; H); p^(wH ; H)) if wL < wH
:
Note rst, that in the limit case where wH = wL, both separating prices give the same
gross revenue by denition,
p(wL; H)D(p(wL; H); H) = p(wL; H)D(p(wL; H); H)
but as p(wL; H) > p(wL; H), the corresponding prots are ranked accordingly so that
p(wL; H) is the least cost separating price for high quality.
The insight from Corollary 5 is twofold. First, to signal high quality, the retailer may
distort the consumer price relative to the full information situation, either downward (pH =
p(wL; H)) or upward (pH = p(wL; H)) depending on whether the wholesale price for high
quality falls short or not of the wholesale price for low quality. Second, to the extent that
pH is biased away from p^(wH ; H), p

H becomes insensitive to changes in wH as shown by the
denitions of p(wL; H) and p(wL; H).
As the complete information price p^(wH ; H) is increasing in wH , there exists two threshold
values for wH , denoted wH and wH and dened by p^(wH ; H) = p(wL; H) and p^(wH ; H) =
p(wL; H).10 Figure 2 depicts pH as a function of wH and for a xed wL, in the special case of
a linear demand D(p; ~q) = 1   p=~q where the perfect information price p^(wH ; H) is a linear
increasing function of wH .
The sense of the signaling distortion necessary to signal high quality to consumers, if any,
is determined backward by the manufacturer. If the wholesale price discriminates on behalf
of low (resp. high) quality, i.e., wL  wH , the manufacturer may induce the retailer to signal
high quality with a price higher (resp. lower) than what would prevail under full information.





















Figure 2: Least cost separating price pH for high quality as a function of wH
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Setting a lower wholesale price to either quality amounts to reducing the retailers cost of
selling this quality. When the retailer considers changing consumer price away from the full
information level, he has to take into account both a direct and an indirect e¤ects on his prot,
which play in opposite directions. First, the retailer directly modies his gross revenue at the
current sale. But second, the retailer changes the demand for his product, thereby modifying
indirectly the prot from sales (net from the wholesale price). Thus, a downward deviation
from the full information price both reduces the gross revenue and increases the net prot by
boosting demand, whereas an upward deviation has the converse e¤ects: it raises the gross
revenue but entails a loss in prot due to lower demand. If the wholesale price for the high
quality is lower than that for the low quality, the type H retailer has more incentive than the
type L to distort downward the consumer price because increased demand for the retailers
product is more protable to the high quality due to less expensive sales. Conversely, if the
type H retailer must pay a wholesale price higher than that proposed to the type L retailer,
distorting upward the consumer price can successfully signal high quality because the global
e¤ect of the foregone prot from adverse business switching on one hand, and the higher gain
from increased price on the other hand, is less damaging to the type H retailer, but also his
gain from increased price is higher. As shown by Figure 2, the cost of signaling is maximum
when wH and wL are alike.
4.2.3 The set of pooling outcomes in G(w;F )
In this section, we characterize the set of pooling equilibria pH = p

L = p
 if any, for a given
pair of wholesale prices w and franchise fees F . Consider a potential pooling price p of the
subgame G (w;F ) such that ~q(p) = q0. Without loss of generality, let consumersbeliefs be
the least favorable ones out of equilibrium from the retailers point of view, i. e., ~q(p) = L for
all p 6= p. As for the separating prices case, individual rationality constraints should hold
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for a potential pooling price, that is:
(p;wH ; q0)  FH  ^(wH ; L)  FH (IRH)
(p;wL; q0)  FL  ^(wL; L)  FL (IRL)
The next Proposition characterizes the set P of pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 6 In the subgame G (w;F ), there may exist a continuum of pooling equilibrium
prices p that conceal information about quality. More precisely, the set P (q0) of pooling
prices is given by:
P (q0) =
 
p(wH ; q0); p(wL; q0)
 6= ? i¤ p(wL; q0) > p(wH ; q0) when wH  wL
p(wL; q0); p(wH ; q0)
 6= ? i¤ p(wL; q0) < p(wH ; q0) otherwise.
Proof: See Appendix E.
4.3 The optimal contract
We now examine the contract chosen by the manufacturer. Given that the manufacturer
has all the bargaining power, the feasibility constraints should bind, that is for a separating
equilibrium:
(pH ;wH ; H)  FH = 0 (15)
(pL;wL; L)  FL = 0 (16)
with pL = p^(wL; L) and p

H 2  and for a pooling equilibrium
(p;wH ; q0)  FH = 0
(p;wL; q0)  FL = 0
with p 2 P (q0). Hence, for q = L;H, the prot of the type q manufacturer writes as
M = (wq   cq)D(pq ; q) + (pq ;wq; q)
= (pq ; cq; q)
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for a separating equilibrium and
M = (wq   cq)D(p; q0) + (p;wq; q0)
= (p; cq; q0)
for a pooling equilibrium.
The role of the wholesale price is to select a particular nal price and the franchise helps
to recover any variable prot (or loss) made by the retailer.
Proposition 7 Optimal contracts set up by the manufacturer make it possible for the retailer
to commit on a unique nal price for each quality level.
(i) If q0  q^0, the manufacturer optimally sets up a contract that achieves separation at the








. This contract involves the following wholesale
prices and franchises:
wL = 0; F

L = ^(0; L)
and
wH =
 2 [0; c] when c  c
c otherwise.
, F H =

(p(0; H);wH ; H) when c  c
^(c;H) otherwise.
(ii) If q0 > q^0, and c  c, the manufacturer optimally sets up a contract that conceals
information and leads to its best pooling price, namely p^(0; q0) for low quality, and
p^(c; q0) for high quality. If c > c then the optimal contract implements separation
without distortion, as when q0  q^0.
Proof: The proof proceeds by rst assuming that the manufacturer seeks separation and
by nding the optimal contract. Second, we assume that the manufacturer wants to conceal
information and we characterize the optimal contract. Finally, we prove that separation is
more protable than pooling when q0  q^0: See appendix F.
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When separation is not costly (c > c), there is a unique contract that leads the retailer to
charge the complete information price for high quality. This constitutes the optimal policy
for the manufacturer whatever the prior q0 of consumers when c > c.
On the contrary, when separation is costly (c  c), note that the manufacturers prot is
insensitive to the choice of wholesale price wH provided it belongs to [0; c]. As a consequence,
there is an innite number of contracts that all lead the high-quality retailer to choose the
separating distorted price p(0; H). Implementing one of theses contracts would prove to
be optimal only if q0  q^0. In that event, the vertical contract selects the signaling prices
involved in the Riley separating outcome. Not only is this the least costly way of disclosing
full information about quality, but also it pays more to disclose full information than to
conceal information.
By contrast, when q0 > q^0, and separation is costly (c  c), the manufacturer prefers
a contract that implements the best pooling price given its type, thereby concealing infor-
mation. As previously seen, if we compare this result to the predictions obtained by using
renement criterions to select reasonable signaling equilibria in the vertically integrated
structure, we have that both pooling prices p^(0; q0) and p^(c; q0) would be eliminated as un-
intuitiveby Cho and Kreps (1987), but would survive as being undefeatedby Mailath et
alii (1993). Interestingly enough, there is a continuity in pricing behaviors between contracts
under complete and incomplete information. The pooling price p^(c; q0) when quality is high
tends to p^(c;H) as q0 approaches H.
As shown in section 3 with the example of Mussa-Rosen preferences, there also exists
circumstances where consumers prefer ex ante not to learn the true quality through price,




This paper addresses the issue of price signaling in a model of vertical relationship between a
manufacturer and a retailer who share the same private information about quality, whereas
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consumers do not observe this characteristic a priori. We show that delegating the price
setting task to a retailer and controlling it through a vertical contract (actually a two-part
tari¤) implements a unique price signaling quality, thereby solving the multiplicity problem
at the consumer level. The franchise paid by the retailer to the manufacturer allows the
latter to restrict the formers choice of signaling prices to the most protable outcome from
the manufacturers standpoint.
The outcome of a unique price charged to consumers emerges without invoking the con-
sumer sophistication usually required by selection criterions. In this paper, the only assump-
tion made on consumer behavior is that they revise their beliefs according to Bayesrule when
observing a price. The vertical contract turns to be the most e¢ cient way for the vertical
chain to tie its hands on a unique nal price. This price may disclose or not information to
consumers depending on their initial optimism about quality.
Using Mussa-Rosen preferences, we prove that there may be circumstances under which
consumers prefer ex ante not to learn the true quality through price. The result of concealing
information with the vertical contract is intriguing in that it proves socially e¢ cient when
consumers hold optimistic beliefs about quality before purchase. It raises the issue of what
would be the optimal anti-trust policy in such a context. Further research is needed to
examine this problem with more general consumer preferences.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
First note that ^(x; L) is strictly positive and decreasing on [0; pmaxL ) and ^(x; L) = 0 on
[pmaxL ; p
max
H ] : Also the strict concavity of prot function with respect to price implies that
the function f(:;x; ~q) is also strictly concave. Moreover, we have f(x;x; ~q) = f(pmax~q ;x; ~q) =
 ^(x; L)  0 and also maxp f(p;x; ~q) = maxp(p x)D(p; ~q) maxp(p x)D(p; L) > 0 as long
as ~q > L.
It follows that there exist two solutions in p to the equation f(p;x; ~q) = 0 and that
f(:;x; ~q) is positive between the roots. If ^(x; L) = 0, the roots are equal to the bounds of
the interval [0; pmaxL ). On the contrary, if ^(x; L) > 0, they are interior values.
Finally, if we denote a generic (interior) root p(x; ~q), for any x and ~q :
f(p(x; ~q);x; ~q) = 0









and when p(x) = p(x; ~q) (resp. p(x; ~q)); we have @f@p > 0 (< 0). Moreover,
@f(p(x; ~q); x)
@x
=  D(p(x; ~q); ~q)  @^(x; L)
@x
:
Recall that @^(x;L)@x =  D(p^(x; L); L) and then we have
@f(p(x; ~q); x)
@x
= D(p^(x; L); L) D(p(x; ~q); ~q)
From (17), it follows that @p(x;~q)@x > 0 if and only if
D(p(x; ~q); ~q) < D(p^(x; L); L) < D(p(x; ~q); ~q): (18)
But by denition, the roots p(x; ~q) and p(x; ~q) are such that:
(p(x; ~q)  x)D(p(x; ~q); ~q) = (p^(x; L)  x)D(p^(x; L); L)
= (p(x; ~q)  x)D(p(x; ~q); ~q)
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and p(x; ~q) < p^(x; L) < p(x; ~q): This implies that (18) holds true and hence, the generic root
is increasing in x, i.e. @p(x;~q)@x > 0:
B Proof of Proposition 1
Let us denote the set of prices that satisfy f(p; c;H)  0 as PH and the set of prices that
satisfy f(p; 0; H)  0 as PL. The set of separating prices is P = PH \PL. A separating price
equilibrium exists whenever this set is non empty and entails some distortion compared to
complete information whenever the optimal price under complete information p^(c;H) does
not belong to that set.
First of all, note that ^(0; L) = maxp pD(p; L) is strictly positive because D(0; L) > 0
by assumption. Hence, following Lemma 1, the two roots of f(p; 0; H), namely p(0; H) and
p(0; H), are interiors and consequently the set PL is

0; p(0; H)
 [ [p(0; H); pmaxH ].
Now for PH , we have two cases that we examine in turn.
(a) ^(c; L) = 0. This is equivalent to c  pmaxL so that a high-quality producer, identied as
a low-quality one, cannot expect making any prots given the cost c. Therefore, the set
PH is simply [c; pmaxH ]. In other words, (IRH) always hold for the range of prices. Also,
it is easy to check that p(0; H) < pmaxL and hence we have p(0; H) < c.
11 Consequently,
P = [max (c; p(0; H)) ; pmaxH ].
(b) ^(c; L) > 0. This is equivalent to c < pmaxL . This means that the set PH is now
p(c;H); p(c;H)
  [c; pmaxH ]. Also, using Lemma 1, we have that p(0; H) < p(c;H) and









Finally, note that in both cases, if p^(c;H) 2 P , that is when p(0; H) < p^(c;H), then the
least-cost separating price is p^(c;H):12 Otherwise, that is when p(0; H) > p^(c;H), then the
least-cost separating price is p(0; H).







= p(c;H), then obviously p^(c;H) 2 P . The same holds when
max(c; p(0; H)) = c.
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C Proof of Claim 3
Consider the parameter conguration such that, rst, the separating price intended to signal
high quality is the upward-distorted price pIH = p(0; H)which happens when c < c and
second, the pooling price p^(c; q0) is more protable to the high-quality monopolist than pIH =
p(0; H)which happens when ^ (c; q^0) > (p(0; H); c;H). In this parameter conguration,
consumers are ex ante better o¤ with p^(c; q0) than with the expected price under costly
revelation if and only if
p^(c; q0) < 0p(0; H) + (1  0)p^(0; L)




2 ; c =
p
H and p^(c; q0) =
q0+c
2 . Hence, the inequality above is equivalent to c <
0
p
H, which is more binding than c < c.
D Proof of Proposition 4
We have already seen that pL = p^(wL; L). It remains to characterize P . Denote PH the set
of pH for which (13) holds. Similarly, denote PL the set of p

H for which (14) holds. Hence,
P = PH \ PL.
Actually, the characterization of P is very similar to the integrated case, although wH can
be higher or lower than wL. Indeed, (13) and (14) write respectively:
f(pH ;wH ; H)  0
f(pH ;wL; H)  0:
Using Lemma 1, we have PL =

wL; p(wL; H)
[[p(wL; H); pmaxH ]. Also, when ^(wH ; L) >
0; or equivalently wH < pmaxL ; then PH =

p(wH ; H); p(wH ; H)
  [wH ; pmaxH ]. If on the
contrary, ^(wH ; L) = 0, that is a high-quality producer identied as a low-quality one
cannot survive on the market given the procurement cost wH , then PH = [wH ; pmaxH ] :
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Consequently, the set P depends on whether the procurement cost are positively cor-
related with quality or not.
(a) Suppose rst that wH > wL, and use Lemma 1:




p(wL; H); p(wH ; H)

; p(wH ; H)

,
 and if ^(wH ; L) = 0, then P = [max (p(wL; H); wH) ; pmaxH ], because wH >
pmaxL > p(wL; H).
(b) Suppose now that wH < wL. Because the condition ^(wL; L) > 0 is necessary for
an equilibrium to exist, this implies here that ^(wH ; L) is also strictly positive as
^(:; L) is decreasing. Using Lemma 1, we have
p(wH ; H) < p(wL; H) and p(wH ; H) < p(wL; H)
because the roots are increasing and hence, by using Lemma 1, we get P =
p(wH ; H);min
 
p(wL; H); p(wH ; H)

.
(c) Suppose nally that wL = wH , then this implies that P is the set of prices such
that f(pH ;wH ; H) = 0. In others words, P =

p(wL; H); p(wL; H)
	
.
E Proof of Proposition 6
The set of constraints can be rewritten as follows, for q = H;L;
(p;wq; q0)  ^(wq; L):
It follows from Lemma 1 that the set of pooling prices is
P =

p(wL; q0); p(wL; q0)
 \ p(wH ; q0); p(wH ; q0) :
Hence, when wH > wL, P =

p(wH ; q0); p(wL; q0)

and when wH  wL, P =

p(wL; q0); p(wH ; q0)

.
F Proof of Proposition 7
The proof proceeds as follows. We rst assume that the manufacturer seeks separation
and nd the optimal contract. Then, we assume that the manufacturer wants to conceal
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information and we characterize the optimal contract. Finally, we prove that separation is
better than pooling when q0  q^0:
1. At a separating equilibrium, the low-quality retailer plays as under perfect information.
The manufacturer has thus no incentives to deviate from the optimal contract under
perfect information, i.e., wL = 0 and thus F

L = ^(0; L). The low-quality retailer
charges pIL and pays the franchise F

L = ^(0; L).






p(0; H); p^(wH ; H)

if wH < 0;
p(0; H) if wH = 0
max (p(0; H); p^(wH ; H)) if 0 < wH
:
 We rst show that choosing wH < 0 is dominated by choosing wH = 0. In
other words it does not pay to charge less than wH = 0 for the high quality.
Indeed, whenever wH is such that min
 
p(0; H); p^(wH ; H)

= p(0; H) then the
manufacturer earns (p(0; H) c)D(p(0; H); H) which is clearly less than (p(0; H) 
c)D(p(0; H); H) because
p(0; H)D(p(0; H); H) = p(0; H)D(p(0; H); H)
by denition and because demand is downward sloping together with p(0; H) >
p(0; H). Hence the manufacturer can earn more by choosing wH = 0.
Also, whenever wH is such that min
 
p(0; H); p^(wH ; H)

= p^(wH ; H) then this
gives a positive prot to the manufacturer only if p^(wH ; H) > c. Hence the
relevant possible set for wH is such that p(0; H) > p^(wH ; H) > c. As p(0; H)
belongs to the set of prices where the prot function (p  c)D(p;H) is increasing
in p (see Figure 1 13), it follows that choosing wH that implements p^(wH ; H) is
13And recall that p(0; H) < p^(0; H) < p^(c;H):
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dominated by choosing wH that implements p(0; H), which itself is dominated by
choosing wH = 0 as shown above.
 Now we know that the best price for maximizing the high-quality manufacturer
prot (p   c)D(p;H) is p^(c;H) by denition. This price can be implemented
through wH = c whenever c  c. Indeed, in this situation we have
pH = max (p(0; H); p^(c;H))
= p^(c;H):
On the contrary, when c < c, we have max (p(0; H); p^(c;H)) = p(0; H). It is still
possible to implement p^(wH ; H) by choosing wH > c but in that case this price is
larger than p(0; H) and thus even more upward distorted than p(0; H) with respect
to p^(c;H); thereby giving less prot. Alternatively, by choosing any wH lower than
c, the price p(0; H) is implemented.
 From this discussion, it follows that the optimum for the manufacturer can be
implemented through the following contract
wH =
 2 [0; c] when c  c
c otherwise.
, F H =

(p(0; H);wH ; H) when c  c
^(c;H) otherwise.
2. We here characterize the optimal contract when the manufacturer wants to conceal
information about quality. A high-quality manufacturer then earns (p  c)D(p; q0) for
any price p and his best possible price is p^(c; q0). A low-quality manufacturer would
earn pD(p; q0) and the best possible price is p^(0; q0). It is possible in principle to have
both prices as part of the set of pooling prices P (q0): Indeed, it would be su¢ cient to
have wH and wL  wH such that
p(wH ; q0)  p^(0; q0) < p^(c; q0)  p(wL; q0):
That is wL su¢ ciently large and wH su¢ ciently low.14
14Or the same condition with inverting wH and wL when wH  wL.
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Note that compared to the vertical integrated case, here the set of pooling prices can
be enlarged as we can choose wL larger than 0 and wH smaller than c. This makes it
possible to reach p^(0; q0) or p^(c; q0) whereas this might not be possible under vertical
integration if both prices do not belong to

p(c; q0); p(0; q0)

.
In general, for given quality q, if the manufacturer o¤ers a wholesale price wq the retailer
may want to implement p^(wq; q0) if this price belongs to the pooling set P0. For this it
is su¢ cient that the manufacturer asks for the franchise
Fq = (p^(wq; q0)  wq)D(p^(wq; q0); q0)
= ^(wq; q0):
Given this franchise, the unique optimal choice of the retailer is to charge p^(wq; q0).
Choosing any other price provides the retailer with negative prots.
3. As soon as the best pooling price for a high-quality manufacturer, p^(c; q0), gives a
larger prot than the one the manufacturer can get with p(0; H), a pooling price will
be preferred. This happens when q0  q^0 and when c  c.
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